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CSM_BITS_ANM_0001

Login Issue

Status: CLOSED

Updated Oct 7, 2026 7:10 PM IST

1. BUG REGISTRATION

S.No.AttributeEntry
1Safety Anomaly IDCSM_BITS_ANM_0001
2Bug TitleLogin Issue
3Bug DescriptionUnable to login/register successfully with valid user credentials.
4Detection SourceUser Report
5Initial EvidenceLogin/registration failure observed.
6Reported BySrikanth KS
7Reported Date/Time28-Aug-2026, 11:00 AM

2.INITIAL ASSESSMENT

S.No.AttributeEntry
1Affected ItemCSM Web Application – Login / Registration
2Version / ConfigurationDeployed CSM application configuration
3Anomaly ClassificationSoftware / Application Issue
4Safety Relevant?No
5Initial Safety ImpactNo direct safety impact identified. The reported issue affects application login/registration functionality.
6Responsible PersonAiSemi Engineering Team
7Initial EvidenceLogin/registration failure as reported by the user.
8Initial Assessment CommentThe reported issue was reviewed and confirmed as a valid application issue. The anomaly was accepted for detailed analysis.
9Replication / Triage StatusConfirmed / Accepted for Analysis
10State Entry Date/Time28-Aug-2026, 11:30 AM
11State Exit Date/Time28-Aug-2026, 12:15 PM

3.ANALYSIS & ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS

S.No.AttributeEntry
1Reproducible?Yes
2Reproduction ResultThe reported login/registration issue was reproduced. Affected authentication and data persistence workflows were observed.
3Reproduction Steps1. Attempt login/registration using a valid user account. 2. Exercise the affected form/register/login/save flows. 3. Observe failure of affected POST requests. 4. Test authentication using a BITS email user when external authentication fails. 5. Observe that the expected local fallback authentication is not invoked.
4Failure ModeValid user authentication, registration, or data persistence operations fail.
5Failure MechanismCertain HTMX/AJAX POST requests did not reliably submit the required CSRF token, causing Django to reject the requests. BITS users were not handled equivalently to AiSemi users when external authentication failed, preventing the expected local authentication fallback.
6Technical AnalysisInvestigation identified two application-level implementation gaps. First, CSRF token submission was not handled reliably across the affected form, register, login and save POST flows. Second, the authentication flow did not provide local fallback authentication for BITS email users when external authentication failed.
7Impact AnalysisThe issue affected authentication and data persistence workflows, resulting in valid users being unable to login/register or complete affected save operations. No impact to safety analysis rules, ASIL values, or safety-related calculation logic was identified.
8RCA MethodTechnical Debugging / Application Flow Analysis
9Root CauseIncomplete CSRF token handling across affected HTMX/AJAX POST flows and incomplete local fallback authentication handling for BITS users.
10Contributing CauseCSRF handling and authentication fallback were not implemented consistently across all applicable request and user-account flows.
11Verification GapTest coverage did not adequately cover CSRF handling across all affected form/register/login/save flows and local authentication fallback for BITS users when external authentication failed.
12Analysis ConclusionThe reported issue was traced to two application-level implementation gaps: unreliable CSRF token submission and missing local authentication fallback for BITS users. Corrective actions were identified for both causes.
13Analysis EvidenceIssue reproduction, application request-flow analysis, authentication-flow analysis, and identification of the affected CSRF and BITS authentication paths.
14RCA Dependency / DelayRCA required a test email for reproduction. The required test email was not received on 28-Aug, and detailed RCA was resumed on 29-Aug at 8:00 AM after the required test input became available.
15State Entry Date/Time29-Aug-2026, 8:00 AM
16State Exit Date/Time29-Aug-2026, 8:20 AM

4.CRITICALITY / SAFETY EVALUATION

S.No.AttributeEntry
1Safety Goal ImpactNo impact identified.
2Safety Requirement ImpactNo impact identified.
3Safety Mechanism ImpactNo impact identified.
4CriticalityLow
5ASIL ImpactNo impact. ASIL values were not altered.
6Risk EvaluationThe issue affected the authentication and data persistence workflow but did not alter safety analysis rules, ASIL values, or safety-related calculation logic.
7Residual RiskLow
8Evaluation RationaleThe anomaly was limited to application authentication and data persistence functionality. No impact was identified on safety analysis rules, ASIL values, or safety-related calculation logic.
9Evaluation EvidenceTechnical analysis of the affected authentication and data persistence workflows and review of the impacted application functionality.
10State Entry Date/Time29-Aug-2026, 8:20 AM
11State Exit Date/Time29-Aug-2026, 8:35 AM

5.CONTAINMENT & CORRECTIVE ACTION

S.No.AttributeEntry
1Containment Required?No separate containment required.
2Containment ActionIssue was addressed directly through corrective software changes.
3Corrective ActionEnsure reliable CSRF token submission across form, register, login and save flows, and enable local fallback authentication for BITS users when external authentication fails.
4Safety MeasureNo product safety measure required. Application-level corrective action was implemented.
5Change Required?Yes
6Change ReferenceSoftware corrective change for CSRF handling and BITS local authentication fallback.
7Action OwnerAiSemi Engineering Team
8Implementation StatusCompleted
9Action EvidenceCode changes implemented for CSRF handling across affected flows and local fallback authentication for BITS users.
10State Entry Date/Time29-Aug-2026, 8:35 AM
11State Exit Date/Time29-Aug-2026, 8:50 AM

6.VERIFICATION & EFFECTIVENESS

S.No.AttributeEntry
1Fix VerificationCorrective changes were verified for CSRF handling and BITS user authentication fallback.
2Verification MethodAutomated test cases and functional retesting of login/registration using a BITS email user on the live domain.
3Verification ResultPass. Login and registration flows completed successfully with the corrective changes.
4Effectiveness Verified?Yes
5Residual ImpactNo known residual impact identified.
6Verification ConclusionThe corrective changes resolved the reported authentication and registration issue.
7Verification EvidenceAutomated test results and live-domain retest results for BITS email user login/registration.
8VerifierAiSemi Engineering Team
9State Entry Date/Time29-Aug-2026, 8:50 AM
10State Exit Date/Time29-Aug-2026, 8:57 AM

7.CLOSURE & APPROVAL

S.No.AttributeEntry
1Closure RouteCorrective action implemented → verification completed → anomaly closed.
2Safety Measure Adequate?Yes. No product safety measure was required.
3Effectiveness Verified?Yes
4Unreasonable Risk?No
5Closure RationaleThe reported authentication and registration issue was corrected and successfully verified. No impact was identified on safety analysis rules, ASIL values, or safety-related calculation logic.
6Closure EvidenceCorrective software changes, automated test results, and live-domain retest results.
7Rationale Reviewed?Yes
8Review CommentsCorrective action and verification evidence reviewed. The reported issue was adequately addressed.
9Closure DecisionCLOSED
10ReviewerAiSemi Engineering Team
11Final StateCLOSED
12State Entry Date/Time29-Aug-2026, 8:57 AM
13State Exit Date/Time29-Aug-2026, 9:00 AM